• Which is the effect of guarantees on the joint value of H+S?
-Gains to S offset by costs for H, or value increase? -Because of diversification?
• Do guarantees affect optimal debt?
• 
What is affected by Guarantees
• The market value of debt, D, depends on guarantees for any given principal.
-Hence both the tax shield and default threshold differ across guarantees, affecting both Tax Savings and Default Costs.
• Default costs also vary because they are directly affected by the provision of support.
• Th 2: i) P * H = 0; ii) P S * > P 1 * + P 2 * if and only if the ratio of default costs to the tax rate is bounded above by a constant Q • i) expected savings in total default costs fall in P H because H is more likely to default and is less likely to support S • ii) tax savings increase in Subsidiary's debt.
-But increasing P S may reduce H ability to support S, thus increasing default costs. -The Q condition ensures that marginal tax gains exceed marginal default costs at P S = P 1 * + P 2 * . -Concave objective required. 
Conclusion
-This paper models for the first time the provision of inter-corporate guarantees. -It offers a rationale for the diffusion of HoldingSubsidiary structures without relying on previous insights relating to internal capital markets and expropriation of minority shareholders. -It explains their observed reliance on debt and their high tax gains, which is of concern to tax authorities.
-Future work • Generalization • Welfare: do guarantees induce too large bankruptcy costs?
